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EDITORIAL
LETTERS TO DR FRANKENSTEIN? ETHICS AND THE 
NEW REPRODUCTIVE TECHNOLOGIES
H e n k  t e n  H a v e
Since the birth of Louise Brown in 1978, new repro­
ductive technologies like IVF, G IFT  and ZIFT have 
become accepted medical treatment; these technol­
ogies are now in widespread use. It is estimated that 
more than 700 IVF programs are in place in 53 
countries; m ore than 40,000 babies have been born 
after the first IV F  birth [1]. However, scientific evalu­
ation o f the appropriate application of these technol­
ogies is missing; only recently, several initiatives have 
been taken to adequately assess the effectiveness, 
safety, costs, risks and benefits of the technologies in 
question. The discrepancy between general accep­
tance and lack of scientific assessment makes it hard 
to determine what is the appropriate use of the new 
reproductive technologies. In the past* several tech­
nologies have moved too quickly from the experimen­
tal to the accepted phase o f application [2]. Given 
such historical lessons, the question therefore is; Why 
has IV F become the accepted treatment for infertility, 
displacing other medical technologies that are more 
effective? Even when adequate assessment has been 
available, public policy had no relation to the evalu­
ation data. F rom  the start, three competing perspec­
tives on IV F have co-existed: IVF as:
(a) laboratory technique;
(b) medical treatment; and
(c) seed-bed of social consequences and risks.
Gradually, the medical perspective has become 
dom inant in public policy. In the Netherlands at 
least, health policy has never been antagonistic 
tow ards the medical development of in vitro fertiliza­
tion [3], On the contrary, when a cost-effectiveness 
study, initiated by the D utch health authorities, 
shows that it is more efficient to have only five centers 
with very large programs than a large number of 
hospitals with smaller programs, the same authorities 
finally decided to license all 12 IVF programs that 
have developed [4].
Despite medical acceptancy and cooperative health 
policy, moral debates continue to accompany the 
development o f new reproductive technologies. But 
here also, thorough studies are relatively rare. The 
majority of debates is rather haphazard and inciden­
tal; discussion goes on in newspapers, radio and
television, focusing on spectacular and exotic issues, 
relevant, if a t all, for only a happy few. Even when 
a technology assessment study is undertaken, a sys­
tematic evaluation of the moral dimensions is gener­
ally n o t incorporated. The result is that whereas 
reproductive technologies have been firmly estab­
lished within everyday medicine, the ethical debate 
concerning these technologies still gives the im ­
pression of an ad “hoc and unsystematic questioning 
of individual cases [5],
THE MORAL CONTEXT OF REPRODUCTIVE
TECHNOLOGIES
C ontinuation  o f the ethical debate indicates that 
reproductive technologies develop within a  value­
laden context which is not negated through wide­
spread application. A t least three characteristics o f  
this context seem important.
1. Increase o f  responsibilities
C reation and improvement of reproductive tech­
nologies have more and more deviated from the 
traditional pattern of procreation. Initially, artificial 
reproduction aims at technically improving the p ro ­
cess of procreation, substituting for deficient parts o f 
the process (through artificial insemination or IVF); 
next, cooperative reproduction aims at substituting 
for the reproductive actors (through egg donation or 
surrogate mothers); finally, selective reproduction 
aims at substituting for qualitative defects in offs­
pring and improving the product o f reproduction 
(through sex selection or pre-implantation diagnosis).
These technological developments have led to more 
individual control over reproduction and parentage, 
but have also expanded individual responsibilities. 
Technology can help to overcome the inevitabilities 
of chance and fate; it may enable individuals to 
determine the course of their lives, but it also necessi­
tates to respond to questions whether, how and when 
to use technological facilities. As soon as reproduc­
tive technology is available, individual choices re­
garding its use can no longer be evaded.
F rom  a moral perspective, more im portant than 
the expansion of responsibilities or the necessity o f
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choices is the question w hat we ought to do when we 
m ake decisions. W hat guideline(s) do we have in 
using or n o t using medical technology? O f course, the 
basic problem  here is that apparently we do not 
have a norm ative guideline outside our own self­
determ inative capacities. Technological control o f  the 
reproductive process in particular has led to the 
erosion o f appeals to nature as a normative determi­
nant. W e now tend to assume that decisions are 
morally acceptable if  they are based on the personal, 
voluntary and considerate choice o f an autonom ous 
subject.
Nonetheless, it is rem arkable that in many debates 
on reproductive technology, references to nature still 
play a definite role. Such references illustrate the need 
to reflect anew upon  the significance o f nature in 
norm ative debates. N atu re  here is not the traditional 
depot from  which specific normative statements can 
be deduced; it is, however, relatively inarticulate; it is 
w hat is beyond our control, what sets a limit to our 
capacities o f  self-determination. N ature  is “ up- 
against-ness” (in the words of Charles Sanders 
Peirce): it is tha t upon  w hat our hum an projects, our 
cognitive constructions, our well-intended interven­
tions do no t have a full grip. In this interpretation, 
nature has m oral significance. The implication is that 
technological developm ent is indeed expanding our 
pow er and responsibility, but is at the same time also 
carrying w ith it the experience that there are crucial 
dimensions o f  our life tha t are not under technologi­
cal control. Precisely in the drive toward control we 
do experience uncontrollability. The problem is that 
in the m oral debate regarding reproductive technol­
ogies the delicate balance between control o f  nature 
and respect for natu re  is no t firmly established but 
needs continuous attention. As elsewhere in the na tu ­
ral sciences, it is no t obvious tha t nature merely is the 
prima materia ready for scientific intervention and 
control under the guidance o f  autonom ous decision­
makers*
2. The social relevancy o f  reproduction: supervision 
and liberation
A rem arkable phenom enon in the area of repro­
ductive technology is the existence of many utopias 
and dark  scenarios. In such literature, one question 
is predom inant: w ho is in control of the application 
of reproductive technology? There is always danger 
that this technology is used for other purposes than 
relief o f  individual need. In  its negativity, this litera­
ture correctly points to  the fact that procreation is no t 
merely a m atte r  o f  individual choice, but also has 
social, sometimes political significance.
Control o f  procreation  implies influencing the evol­
ution o f society and the quantity  and quality o f future 
generations. H istorical studies show the interconnec­
tion of procreation  and  social order (see for example 
R e f  [6]).
Today, even with the emphasis on individual repro­
ductive choices, social implications cannot be disre­
garded in moral evaluation, for example in the 
current debate on sex selection [7]. It is not only 
because every individual decision has social impli­
cations, but also because of the moral dimension of 
procreation itself, tha t such social control issues are 
and should be raised. In  as far as procreation is not 
merely a physiological function such as digestion, 
circulation or respiration, but the creation of new life, 
and thus o f potential new members o f society, procre­
ative decisions are not merely a private responsibility.
This is not to say that procreation should be 
subjected to the sam e mechanisms o f  control or 
m anipulation as in the past. It only calls attention to 
the fact that the present-day emphasis on individual 
reproductive choice tends to forget the dimension of 
social control. I t  is obvious tha t the availability of 
reproductive technologies has had liberating effects, 
especially for women. I t  also helped people to over­
come negative attitudes towards sexuality and tra­
ditional paternalism  an d  moralism in res sexualibus. 
These effects can hardly be denied. Nonetheless, 
liberty in this context has its price: procreation, 
pregnancy, childbirth and childbed have at the same 
time become objects o f  a new type o f control and 
supervision.
The long-time distinction between normal and 
medically abnorm al (or medically assisted) procre­
ation is m ore and m ore obliterated. N orm al procre­
ation is gradually embedded in a medical context; 
even the period before conception is medicalized 
through the developm ent of preconceptional care and 
genetic counseling. Certain standards o f  responsible 
behavior tow ards the process o f procreation have 
been developed which make it som ewhat naive to 
state that reproductive choices are primarily a private 
m atter. Individual freedom to procreate has increased 
within the context o f  expanding practices o f supervi­
sion and counseling, guided by ‘reproduction ex­
perts’. This concom itan t development makes moral 
judgm ents ambiguous: instead o f a rather straightfor­
ward evaluation in terms of emancipation o f medical- 
ization, we are confronted with both phenom ena at 
the same time.
3. Interrelation o f  ethics and technology
A third  contextual factor initiating constant ethical 
debate is the problem atic relationship between medi­
cal interventions, particularly in the area of hum an 
reproduction, and m oral reflection. Exemplary is the 
response, early this year, of a researcher to criticism 
of his experiments with ovarian tissue from aborted 
foetuses. He canno t understand why all letters ad ­
dressed “ Dr. Frankenstein, University o f E dinburgh” 
are re-directed to him. The experiments are techni­
cally well-designed and  feasible; they are promising 
and m ay offer a solution to specific problems; poss­
ible m oral issues will be reviewed by the institute’s 
ethics committee. In the researcher’s opinion, ethical 
problems will only arise when the results o f the 
experiments are applied to patients. Such opinion is
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not unusual: technology first, then ethical reflection. 
Given the dynamics of scientific and technological 
evolution, it is hard to predict what will be tomor­
row’s knowledge and medical practice, and thus 
difficult to develop normative frameworks for future 
application. But opinions like these give voice to an 
old-fashioned demarcation between value-free acqui­
sition of knowledge and value-laden application of 
knowledge. However, the idea that ethical reflection 
is following (or lagging behind) technological devel­
opments is also related to a predilection within ethics 
itself for a particular type of problems and questions 
[8].
t
TYPES OF MORAL QUESTIONS
When medical technology is evaluated, two types 
of questions are relevant from an ethical point of 
view:
(1) Moral questions that arise within the framework 
o f  the technology. Examples, in the context of IVF, 
concern the moral status of the embryo, the right to 
procreation, the conditions for surrogate mother­
hood. Characteristic of this type of questions is that 
they remain within the framework of the technology; 
they proceed from a basic acceptance of the technol­
ogy as a datum or fait accompli; their underlying 
concern is how its responsible and appropriate use 
can be defined.
(2) Moral questions that concern the technology 
itself Here, analysis is not directed on justifiable 
applications, but on the question whether the tech­
nology as such is justified in the light of moral values. 
Technologies are expressions of fundamental values, 
such as the search for knowledge or the relief of 
suffering; however, these values are no longer taken 
as implicitly given, but as starting-point for a debate 
on (other) motivating values in society.
Usually, only the first type of moral questions are 
addressed when a new reproductive technology is 
morally evaluated. The problem here is not only that 
this is a too narrow focus. It also points to a more 
fundamental dilemma. If it is true that our life-world 
is more and more penetrated and dominated by 
science and technology, especially medical science 
and technology, and if this is the cause for more and 
more moral questions, then the answer to such 
questions cannot be found through a technological 
ethics which is itself a symptom of the fundamental 
problem. What is regarded as the solution, is in fact 
another manifestation of the problem. The basic 
objection against focusing upon the above first type 
of ethical questions is that in doing so, ethics is 
incorporated in a technological model aiming at 
evaluating and calculating effects, and at controlling 
and eliminating problems. The suggestion that such 
a conception of techno-ethics is just a component of 
the fundamental problem that brings us to moral 
debate in the first place, is not even considered a
relevant one. On the other hand, more attention to 
the second type of ethical questions does not necess­
arily imply a negative attitude towards reproductive 
technologies. The basic intuition about the relevancy 
of such questions is that these technologies are 
morally ambiguous and that this ambiguity needs 
clarification. A priori approval or condemnation is 
therefore not possible. Use of reproductive technol­
ogies may ameliorate human suffering and enhance 
happiness; but it may also create problems through 
changing role models, influencing personal relations, 
and affecting the moral status of embryos. In evaluat­
ing the technologies, a moral judgment on their 
appropriate or inappropriate use is not sufficient; our 
own position as moral actors is also at stake because 
these technologies confront us with the query what 
kind of people we want to be. Why do we want 
children? What kind of parents do we want to be? 
What kind of relations do we want between men and 
women? Such questions can no longer be addressed 
within the given framework of the technology but 
they challenge the significance of technological inter­
vention itself.
THE RATIONAL APPROACH OF REPRODUCTIVE
TECHNOLOGIES
Medicine’s standard way to evaluate the signifi­
cance of technological intervention is a rationalistic 
approach. Before new technologies are allowed to 
proliferate, they need scientific assessment, based on 
valid information on the effectiveness, safety, costs, 
benefits and harms of the technology in question. 
Application of a technology is appropriate if it is 
effective as well as beneficial for individual patients.
Unfortunately, such type of evaluation is not avail­
able for the new reproductive technologies. In fact, in 
a recent study, it is concluded that the rapid, wide­
spread proliferation of IVF is not justified by its* 
scientific assessment [9]. If IVF is considered like 
every other medical treatment and if it is analysed 
and evaluated with the same criteria as other services, 
then it will most probably not receive a positive 
judgment. Too many open questions can be ident­
ified: the ambiguity of the problem (infertility) as well 
as the criteria of success, the uncertainty about risks, 
benefits and costs, the lack of attention to prevention 
and alternatives, the need for public policy and 
quality assurance.
Definitions of infertility are problematic because 
the differentiation between normal and abnormal is 
arbitrary. The World Health Organization defines 
infertility as not conceiving after cohabitation for two 
years, while the U.S. Office of Technology Assess­
ment defines it as the inability to conceive after 12 
months of intercourse without contraception [10]. It 
is obvious that different definitions have important 
consequences for the alleged prevalence of infertility.
Similar ambiguities exist for the effectiveness of 
IVF. Various definitions of efficacy (e.g. embryo
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transfer, started treatment, clinical pregnancy, live 
birth) lead to different success rates. It is argued that 
determining the true effectiveness of IVF requires a 
comparison with other treatments for infertility and 
with no treatment at all [11]. Such clinical trials may 
prove that IVF has limited value; a considerable 
proportion of women accepted in IVF programs will 
achieve pregnancy without treatment.
A third problem concerns risk assessment. In fact, 
there is a lack of scientifically valid information 
derived from epidemiological studies.
Many questions concerning the risks are unan­
swered. Stephenson concludes that given these uncer­
tainties, infertility problems should be managed 
conservatively; one should not assume that medical 
options in infertility are preferable [12], Koch ident­
ifies a large range of risks: complications of oocyte 
retrieval, complications of embryo or egg transfer, 
birth complications, long-term risks for children, 
psychosocial impact on women [13]. Relier, 
Couchard and Huon indicate that in their Paris 
Neonatology Intensive Care Unit, one in every five 
babies is an IVF baby. They conclude that the 
tragedy of infertility should be balanced against the 
tragedy of perinatal death, the suffering of extremely 
ill neonates, and the devastation of long-term handi­
caps [14].
From a scientific perspective, the practice of the 
new reproductive technologies is profoundly ir­
rational. New technologies should not be widely 
diffused as accepted medical treatment until scientific 
assessment has been completed. Why then are repro­
ductive technologies widely used? It seems that a 
rational, scientific perspective is inadequate to under­
stand the significance of reproductive medicine. Per­
haps a better approach is to proceed from the 
motivations of the relevant actors (doctors as well as 
patients). The use of this spectacular technology 
seems to be driven by the moral motivation that it 
will enhance the interests of suffering persons. If that 
is true, a moral debate is inescapable: given the 
scientific irrationality, we should analyse and discuss 
the objectives and practices of reproductive technol­
ogy primarily from a moral point of view.
THE ROLE OF MORAL EXPERIENCE
For many people, having children is self-evident. 
This normal perspective is broken when, for whatever 
reason, persons do not succeed in becoming parents 
and bringing children into the world. Being unable to 
bear children, they may experience stress, guilt, self­
blame and feelings of loss and inadequacy. Infertility 
may threaten one's self-concept or may be regarded 
as a symbol of role failure.
Confronted with such negative experiences, repro­
ductive technologies can only be considered morally 
good: they may take away the suffering due to 
infertility and the adverse psychosocial impact of 
involuntary childlessness. Of course, problem and
solution are not unrelated. The experience of infertil­
ity as a tragedy cannot be separated from the increas­
ing control over the reproductive process. Infertility 
creates a stronger feeling of being out of control now 
that contraceptives enable us not to have children. 
While at one moment children are not allowed to 
come, they must come at another moment when they 
are desired. Since fertility is a matter of personal 
control, infertility is a problem because begetting 
seems to escape control. With such desire for chil­
dren, restoration of control over reproduction can 
only be experienced as good; within this context, 
reproductive technology will necessarily be valued 
positively. In IVF literature, negative patients’ experi­
ences and relief of suffering brought about through 
medical intervention, dominate as major moral jus­
tifications for the use of reproductive technology. 
And to a certain extent—they are.
Nonetheless, the story of experiences is more com­
plicated. First, it should be pointed out that persons 
involved in an IVF program are not representative of 
all infertile people. Not for everyone is infertility a 
tragedy. Results of studies on the psychosocial im­
pact of infertility may thus be biased. Moreover, 
childlessness may be experienced as a source of 
suffering, now that IVF is advertised as a remedy. 
The perception of a problem may therefore be influ­
enced through the availability of a promising sol­
ution, This interrelation implies that the ‘negativity’ 
of experiences becomes less massive and overwhelm­
ing. Similar arguments can be made about the experi­
enced ‘positivity’ of IVF as solution. There are also 
studies describing the negative impact of IVF treat­
ments on women [15]. For the majority of patients the 
problem of infertility in the end will not be resolved. 
Experiences which initially present themselves as 
strongly negative or positive, can therefore, upon 
reflection, not be interpreted as unambiguous.
A second complication is that the notion of experi­
ence itself is changed as soon as reproductive technol­
ogy is available, whether we actually use it or not. 
Sherwin, for example, criticizes ethical studies of IVF 
for their emphasis on individual autonomy and for 
their lack of attention to the medical reduction of 
women’s experiences [16]. She argues that there is a 
two-fold reduction: a compression of the problem 
definition (infertility is a biological defect leading to 
psychological distress), and a narrowing of the range 
of possible solutions into a preferred technical inter­
vention. The point is that experiences of infertility are 
no longer ‘naive’: they are no longer prior to techno­
logical opportunities, justifying the use of technology, 
but they have ‘passed through’ such opportunities, 
and are therefore specified, modified and coloured. 
The effects of this process are visible in our culture. 
Fertility no longer is a characteristic of a couple, but 
it is individualized. Time as a relevant dimension is 
eliminated, now that connections between gener­
ations can be by-passed. Synchronic and diachronic 
relations characterizing fertility have therefore be-
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come contingent. The emphasis on biomedical inter­
ventions has made other approaches less attractive 
and tends to produce relative neglect of prevention of 
infertility. It also localizes the problem within the 
woman’s body [17].
The conclusion is that moral experience nowadays 
is mediated through medical technology. We cannot 
determine whether a technology is morally desirable 
or not, without acknowledging that the technology 
itself is influencing this determination. The experience 
which is at the basis of moral judgment is itself 
pre-formed by a medical perspective. This formative 
perspective—that within the context of reproductive 
interventions is problematic on rational, scientific 
grounds—connects a technological solution with a 
specific vision of the problem (infertility as a biologi­
cal disorder), the body (a scientifically controlled 
reproducing organism) and interpersonal relations 
(emphasizing the importance of genetic identity).
The only way to evade a naive moral judgment is 
to focus on the relationship between technology and 
experience as the proper object of reflection.
TECHNOLOGY-MEDIATED EXPERIENCE
In this approach, changing technology itself is 
object of analysis. Thus, the above-mentioned second 
type of moral questions is on the agenda. Theme is 
no longer the effect of medical technology, but the 
technical rationality manifesting itself in and through 
technology. It may be questioned, for example, what 
we do when this type of rationality dominates our 
response to complicated human situations and ex­
periences of suffering, bodiliness, finiteness, disability 
and illness. There is no doubt that the fascination 
and superiority of technical rationality has brought 
many positive things, but it is also associated with 
compartmentation and reduction of experiences and 
interpretations. Technology often seems to be con­
nected with a tendency to value objects, things, 
instruments more than people. Literature on repro­
ductive technology usually refers to treatment cycles, 
embryo transfers or pregnancies, not to women, 
mothers or babies. Medical discourse concentrates on 
bodily processes and organic functions. Another 
example of the impact of technological rationality is 
the emergence of specific conflicts of interests since 
the introduction of technology in clinical practice; the 
treating physician now is in many cases at the same 
time scientific researcher; it can no longer be naturally 
assumed that the interest of the individual patient will 
prevail over other important interests. Particularly in 
the area of reproductive medicine, many less idealistic 
interests play a role (reputation, business, employ­
ment). A third example of what technological ration­
ality may bring about is that the availability of 
technology may also induce in patients some alien­
ation from their own subjective experiences. The 
availability of reproductive technologies is changing 
the meaning of female bodiliness; reproduction and
fertility are considered as body functions that are 
re-interpreted with an implicit norm of productivity. 
Women’s experiences can only be exchanged within 
a medically orientated view of the body.
These examples indicate how technical rationality 
is determining our thinking and acting. Precisely the 
tendency of technology to re-orient and dominate our 
experiences and practices is, although known for a 
long time, at the root of our discomfort about 
technological medicine and the reason to ask moral 
questions. Ethical reflection should, therefore, at­
tempt to explore and articulate the fundamental 
discontent evoked by medical technology as the basic 
source of moral issues; ethical debate should try to 
detect and reveal new perspectives. This articulation 
should not work with a pessimistic sense of being 
overwhelmed by the power of technical rationality; it 
should start from the notion that a better understand­
ing of technology’s power also implies insights into 
the limits of a technological worldview and image of 
man. Not despite but because of technology, man is 
able to obtain a better understanding of the condition 
humaine. It is particularly the massive dominance of 
technology which stimulates us to search for other 
aspects of being human than mere technical, instru­
mental action. The more our bodies, our lives, our 
experiences of being parents, or our grievances and 
suffering for being childless are moulded and con­
trolled by medical technology, the more we can 
discover that the meaning of human existence is not 
reduced to increasing regulation and control of life 
and world. That is a major reason to explicate moral 
experiences that are not dominant within medical 
discourse, and to reflect upon those experiences which 
tend to be marginalized through the spectacular, 
breathtaking impact of technological rationality.
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